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Abstract
It is increasingly impossible to understand and explain the shape and delivery of
contemporary social policy unless we consider the role of business. Several factors have been at
work here. First, many of the changes in social policy introduced since the 1970s have been in
response either to business demands or more general concerns about national competitiveness
and the needs of business. Second, globalisation has increased corporate power within states,
leading to transformations in social and fiscal policies. Third, business has been incorporated
into the management of many areas of the welfare state by governments keen to control
expenditure and introduce private sector values into services. Fourth, welfare services, from
hospitals to schools, have been increasingly opened up to private markets. Despite all this, the
issues of business influence and involvement in social policy has been neglected in the literature.
This article seeks to place corporate power and influence centre-stage by outlining and critically
reflecting on the place of business within contemporary welfare states, with a particular focus
on the UK. Business, it argues, is increasingly important to welfare outcomes and needs to be
taken into account more fully within the social policy literature.
Introduction
It is increasingly impossible to understand and explain the shape and delivery
of contemporary social policy unless we consider the role of business. To begin
with, many of the changes in social policy introduced since the 1970s have been
in response either to business demands or more general concerns about national
competitiveness and the needs of business. Second, globalisation has increased
corporate power within states, and, while this has not inevitably led to welfare
retrenchment, it has certainly led to reforms in social and fiscal policies in most
states. Third, business has been increasingly incorporated into the management
of many areas of the welfare state by successive governments keen to control
expenditure and introduce private sector values into services. Services within
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most welfare states have been forced to consider the needs of the private sector
when deciding on the shape and delivery of services. Finally, welfare services,
from hospitals to schools, have been increasingly opened up to private markets.
Despite all this, the issues of business influence and involvement in social policy
has been neglected in the literature. This article seeks to place corporate power
and influence centre-stage by outlining and critically reflecting on the place of
business within contemporary welfare states, with a particular focus on the UK.
We have divided the article into three parts: the first theorises about corporate
power, drawing a clear distinction between structural context and the operation
of agency; the second maps out different corporate inputs into social policy; and
the third part examines recent developments in the business–social policy nexus
within the UK.
Corporate power and social policy
Although corporate power has been neglected more generally in the social
policy literature, it has been afforded some attention by globalisation theorists.
According to Susan Strange (1996: 3–4), corporations grew so powerful over
the 1980s that, by the mid 1990s, they, rather than politicians, had come to
assume political authority over governments. For Mishra (1999: 12) economic
globalisation had, by the late 1990s, ‘strengthened the hands of capital against the
nation state’ with the consequence, according to Roth (2002: 33), that:
corporate power is so influential in both private and government policy that what we may once
have called ‘democracies’ are often more accurately described now as ‘corpocracies’
Such views have been criticised for their simplistic treatment of corporate
power, but few critics have offered sufficiently detailed explorations and analyses
of the conditions under which corporate power, in its various forms, is
transformed, translated and exercised within contemporary welfare states. Our
argument here, building on institutionalist theories, is that business plays an
increasingly important role in shaping social policies. Although corporate power
has increased, it is neither linear nor constant, but exercised differently and with
different effects at various levels of policy making as well as between policy areas.
To illustrate variable corporate power more clearly, we make a distinction here
between structure and agency and these are mapped out in turn below.
Contextualising corporate power: structural factors
Although structural power tends to be neglected outside Marxist analysis,
business is able to exert a great deal of influence over policy outcomes through
economic and political structureswithout resorting to agency (action). According
to theorists of structural power, various mechanisms restrict the policies of the
capitalist state to those which are compatible with the basic needs (though not
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necessarily the wants) of business. The most important mechanism of structural
power stems from capital’s ability to make free investment decisions and it is
this dimension of power on which economic globalisation theories focus. Since
business investment is a key determinant of future production, employment
and consumption levels, low levels of investment by the business sector will
often translate into future economic hardship for labour and electoral failure
for ruling parties (Block, 1977; Lindblom, 1977; Winters, 1996: 28–36). Moreover,
since the state is structurally dependent on capital for its own revenue (Offe and
Ronge, 1982), low levels of investment will impact negatively on future spending
capacities. Hence, states must try to induce corporations to invest through
pursuing policies which are favourable to the pursuit of profit (Przeworski
and Wallerstein, 1988: 12; Lindblom, 1977) and must, within an increasingly
global world, compete with other states both to retain existing investments and
attract new forms. To put it more starkly, whatever the ideological persuasion
of the government in power, it will have to guard against doing anything that
undermines capital accumulation. In short, the decisions of policy makers are
structurally framed by the imperative to induce companies to invest. Other actors
also exercise agency within this environment which, in turn, impacts on their
own strategies to attempt to influence. Thus, structure helps to shape the nature
of business inputs into social policy, including whether or how to take action.
Structural power is not uniform, however. The extent to which it impacts
on governments and states depends on how mobile capital is; the number of
alternative investment opportunities open to firms; the relative strength of the
economy and the degree to which governments will be prepared to compete to
retain present investment or attract new investments. We return to these issues
later.
Corporate agency: business inputs into social policy
We turn now to consider business agency and social policy, viewed here
as direct business inputs into social policy. We distinguish between three broad
inputs: political engagement, institutional participation and provision. These
categories are set out in Table 1 and discussed in detail below.
Corporations and political engagement
Business is able to exert influence through its engagement in the political
process on two fronts. To begin with, business and sympathetic elites dominate
strategic positions within the state according to both Marxist and elite theorists
(Miliband, 1969; Scott, 1991). For elite theorists, business leaders and senior
politicians occupy identical elite networks which reinforce social ties and privilege
and, most importantly, serve to quell opposition to business (Scott, 1991: 137).
Such networks develop, not only out of shared class positions, but the dependence
of political parties on private finance which, in turn, buys access to senior
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politicians and often favourable policy outcomes for business. Corporate funding
of other bodies, such as think-tanks and research institutes, is also important to
shaping political debate.
Even without generous funding, the important economic position occupied
by business in capitalist societies means that the largest associations and firms
and the most senior business people will usually enjoy good access to senior civil
servants and members of the cabinet, including the prime minister (Bonnett, 1985;
Offe and Weisenthal, 1980). Policy makers also consult widely with business on
key issues of concern, including trading policy, productivity and competitiveness.
The actual influence that business exerts on policy outcomes, however,
is circumscribed by several factors. First of all, past policy decisions, or
policy legacies, reduce the capacity for policy makers to enact change, even if
pressed for by business. Second, power varies according to the size and relative
importance of the business organisation concerned, including the sector in which
it trades. Third, access to state decision–making institutions will be an important
determinant of the extent to which business preferences shape policy outcomes
and on how business chooses to exert influence. In some states, most obviously
those with corporatist structures, there exists a high level of co-operation, co-
ordination and consultation between governments and various stakeholders,
including business. Fourth, the relative power and influence of rival groups is also
important. Where trade unions are well organised and wider political support
of the left is high, relative business power and influence is likely to diminish.
Fifth, the extent of co-ordination among business and the political right is also
important to the propagation and ascendance of business views.
Quite how business chooses to exercise agency, and how it formulates and
communicates its own position, will be shaped by all these factors (Pierson,
1995). The important thing to bear in mind here is that lobbying and political
engagement are not entered into lightly, and business will not seek to act on all
issues. Calculations of the likely impact of political action, as well as the cost of
failing to act, will be important to a subsequent decision to engage in the political
process. Where structural power is high, business will often decide not to act –
it will not need to. Whether and how business engages in the political process
will depend on the issue in question and the stakes involved. Also important is
the extent to which business is interested in an issue and whether it is united or
divided. While most parts of business are interested in corporate taxation and
capable of formulating a relatively united position on the issues, an issue such
as the privatisation of health care divides business opinion, with private health
companies lobbying hard for such moves and other parts of business, especially
labour-intensive industries, fearing high employee insurance costs, as faced by
their counterparts in the US. Other issues divide large from small companies and
industrial from financial capital and still others hardly raise any interest at all
from the business community.
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Institutional participation
In addition to their ability to exert political pressure on policy makers,
business actors increasingly shape welfare services through their occupation
of key roles within them. It is common for business people to occupy board
positions, and often the most senior roles, within government quangos, hospital
and university boards, and school and college governing bodies. Business has also
increasingly been integrated into services through the establishment of public–
private partnerships (PPPs) designed to expose them to private sector values
and ensure that public services better meet the needs of the private sector. Such
partnerships range from relatively informal agreements with schools to set up
work experience placements or staff exchanges, to formal and contractually based
partnerships where responsibilities for the management and delivery of services
have been passed to private companies, as in the case of some PFI deals (see below).
Thus, even more than is the case with political participation, state-engineered
openings to services are crucial to business inputs into services.
Provision and production
In addition to their political activity and institutional involvement in services,
firms play important roles in the provision of services and the production of goods
that are crucial to the delivery of those services. Firms involved in these activities
can be sub-divided into six distinct categories according to the role they perform,
as outlined below.
First, firms provide services to the end user. This is most important because
firms in this category deliver welfare services directly to the public as an alternative
to the direct provision of such services by the state itself. Such businesses include
private providers of health and education services, among others. Payment
for receipt of these services may also be based in the private sphere, in the
form of insurance cover or out-of-pocket payments, or may come from a state
agency, either in the form of a contractual subsidy or through a state insurance
scheme. The extent of private provision will clearly vary between welfare states,
depending on the extent of state provision and the form of welfare funding. So,
for example, private hospital provision is much higher in the United States than
it is in the United Kingdom, since Americans predominantly pay for their health
care through private insurance arrangements, while the British health system
is funded from taxation and largely provided by the state. However, current
processes of reform in the UK health system illustrate how private provision
of welfare services may be expanded through the use of tax-funded contracting
(Holden, 2003).
Second, firms produce welfare-related goods. Welfare services rely on a
range of goods which are largely produced in the private sector but which are
crucial to the operation of state-provided services. So, for example, health services
cannot operate without the use of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment,
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which are produced largely by global corporations. Similarly, schools cannot
operate without the use of educational resources and (increasingly) information
technology produced in the private sector. In order to secure the needs of its
citizens, the state must thus regulate firms providing such goods in a number of
different ways. In the pharmaceutical sector, for example, the state must regulate
in order to ensure the cost effectiveness of medicines bought or subsidised by the
public sector, the safety and efficacy of the substances produced and also oversee
the research and development process in the pursuit of innovation and industrial
policy goals.
Third, firms supply services both to the state and other service providers.
Suppliers of services can be differentiated from direct providers of services to
the end user, in that they occupy a distinct place in the value chain. While
having no contact with the end users, such firms are crucial to the functioning
of service providers, and therefore interact with state providers of services in
similar ways to the producers of welfare-related goods. Ancillary services such
as cleaning and catering are important primarily for reasons of cost control,
and such services have been increasingly contracted out to the private sector in
a number of countries in recent years. Suppliers of services also include those
concerned with management and consultancy services, which have a more direct
impact on the nature of the service provided to the end user as well as wholesalers
and distributors of goods such as pharmaceuticals, and may therefore play a
crucial intermediary role between producers of goods and direct providers of
services.
Fourth, firms provide insurance and pensions and, although insurers are
strictly speaking providers of services to the end user, we have placed them in a
separate category as a result of the distinct nature of that service. As providers
of a financial service, such firms either provide an opportunity to pool risk or to
save for retirement. Insurers may provide payment for health or long-term care
services, or insurance against sickness or disability, while pension funds provide
a means of saving for an income in retirement. Such firms have a different
relationship to the state than other providers of services, since they offer an
alternative payment mechanism for those services that could be funded directly
by the state. As manifestations of finance capital, they may also have a different
relationship to other sectors of capital.
Fifth, firms invest in physical assets. These firms have also been placed in a
separate category in order to reflect their distinct role. In order to operate, direct
providers of welfare services must have access to physical infrastructure, primarily
in the shape of buildings. Such assets may or may not be owned by the state, but
are invariably designed and constructed in the private sector. The longevity of
such assets and the large sums of investment necessary for their construction
mean that they tend to play a different economic role to the other sub-categories
of business discussed in this section. In fact they have a close relationship with
finance capital, since they may provide a vehicle for long-term investment. So,
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for example, in the UK long-term care market, where the majority of provision is
now carried out in the private sector, an extensive property market has developed
involving real estate investment trusts (REITs). The larger providers of long-
term care services have engaged extensively in sale and leaseback deals with
REITs in order to fund their further expansion. The Private Finance Initiative
(PFI) involves consortia in similar types of arrangement, whereby consortiums of
private businesses finance and build physical infrastructure such as hospitals and
schools and then lease them to the public sector over an agreed period (typically
30 years).
Sixth, firms make provision for their own employees. Occupational welfare
is a form of provision which is distinct from the other types of provision
in this category, in that firms themselves act as providers of benefits and
services to their own workers. In some respects, occupational welfare merely
represents one dimension of the total compensation paid to workers and is thus
financed by employees themselves. However, it also forms important protection
against various risks associated with the workplace. Statutory provision includes:
employers’ national insurance contributions (NICs); the funding and provision of
some statutory benefits, including SERPS (state earnings-related pension scheme)
contributions; occupational pensions (where employers’ pensions schemes are
provided as a substitute for state schemes); sickness benefits; maternity leave; and
redundancy pay. Non-statutory provision includes a range of benefits that are
made available for employees. Through these various forms employers influence
the overall shape and size of social provision paid to employees.
These different sub-categories of provision are summarised in Table 1. They
reflect different functions necessary for the ‘production’ of welfare, and, as
such, any given firm may in fact be included in a number of sub-categories.
A firm involved in the construction of a hospital, for example, may also provide
management services as part of a PFI deal, and may simultaneously provide
occupational welfare benefits to its employees. However, while the category of
provision reflects functional roles rather than types of political engagement, the
political significance of the involvement of private corporations in the provision
of welfare services cannot be under-estimated. While it is government that
ultimately sanction this involvement, such policies are difficult and costly to
reverse. Once a corporation is involved in such provision, a private interest is
created, at the heart of the welfare state, whose primary goal is the accrual of profit.
Such firms then have open to them all the means of political engagement and
institutional involvement described in previous sections in order to defend and
extend their interests. Once granted, corporate involvement in welfare provision
becomes difficult to reverse.
The contemporary picture
Having outlined our typology of business inputs into social policy, this section
traces the changing emphasis placed on each of these during recent years in the
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TABLE 1. Corporate inputs into social policy.
Provision and production
Institutional participation
Structural
factors
Political
engagement Informal Formal
Provision of
services to
end users
Production
of goods
Suppliers of
services to
the state
Insurance
and
pensions
Investment
in physical
assets
Occupational
welfare
Imperative to
induce
business to
invest
Social policy
directed
towards
meeting the
perceived or
actual needs
of business
Only
productive
welfare
thought to be
compatible
with contem-
porary
economies
Lobbying
Funding
political
parties
Political
participa-
tion
One-off
corporate
donations
Provision
of cur-
riculum
materials
Workbased
placements
Involvement
by companies
and business
people in the
management
of state
services
Education
Action Zones
Health
Action Zones
Formal
sponsorship
deals (e.g.
City
Academies /
Specialist
schools)
Care homes
Private toll
roads
Private
schools
Housing
associations
Private
landlords
Private
hospitals
Pharmaceutical
companies
Medical
equipment
providers
ICT
companies
Producers of
educational
resources
Catering
firms
Ancillary
services
Manage-
ment
services
Con-
sultancy
Health
insurance
companies
Private
pensions
Sickness
and
personal
injury
companies
Mortgage /
loan
protection
schemes
REITs
PFI
Construc-
tion
firms
Occupational
pensions
Training
Nursery /
Child care
provision
Counselling
services
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UK. First, however, we discuss the increased importance of structural pressures
in shaping contemporary social policy.
The structured context of business inputs into social policy
As already noted above, the extent of corporate structural power is directly
related to the extent of capital’s mobility. Because of this, globalisation has had
a positive impact on corporate structural power. Despite important evidence of
the uneven speed and spread of capital between some parts of the world, there
has occurred a rapid growth in internationally mobile financial and industrial
capital as a result of a general relaxation in capital controls since the 1970s (Held
et al., 1999: 210). This has placed much greater pressure on nation states to pursue
tight domestic monetary policy in order to foster confidence among financial
traders (Held et al., 1999: 229) and on labour to pursue wage claims and labour
conditions that are compatible with competitive markets.
This is not to argue that under globalisation business is all powerful. Even
under globalisation, states retain some autonomy. Capital is not as mobile as is
often thought, and disunity often prevents it from pushing a single line on many
issues. Yet the global context within which policy is made has become increasingly
important to shaping welfare outcomes. The impact of globalisation on corporate
power and social provision has not been uniform across states (Swank, 2002),
but it has certainly had a dramatic impact on British social policy (for a review
of the evidence on this see Farnsworth, 2004a).
One of the most obvious ways structural pressures have impacted on social
policy has been the redirection of welfare services towards the perceived needs of
business and the economy. Central to this strategy is the view that the more social
policy is geared towards employers, the stronger will be the economy, the higher
will be national income, and the lower will be unemployment and its associated
problems. The exposure of the UK to competitive international markets and
highly mobile firms re-framed the social policy debate for Labour so that only
those forms of social provision that increased competitiveness and productivity
were considered to be compatible with contemporary capitalism. Hence, where
the government has sought to introduce policies that business has opposed on
the grounds that they will undermine competitiveness, it has proceeded with
caution and attempted to assure employers that the impact of reforms will be
minimised.
We will keep a flexible labour market. Even where you may have doubts about certain parts of
policy – a minimum wage or trade union representation – remember: that we are consulting
business every step of the way; and that taken altogether, the entire changes proposed would
still leave us with a labour market considerably less regulated than that of the USA. (Blair’s
speech to CBI Conference, 14 April 1998)
Labour felt that by ensuring a better fit between social policy and the needs
of business, the government would be in a better position both to continue to
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attract new investment and fund future welfare commitments. It thus set about
trying to steer social policy towards business needs and attempted to locate more
efficient ways of delivering services. Both strategies entailed the closer integration
of business into social policy making and delivery. Hence, Labour did not require
the protestations and representations of business to place corporate interests
centre-stage: perceived structural pressures were enough to drive New Labour’s
corporate-centred social policy.
Political engagement
At the international level, business has become better organised and
has played an increasingly important role within international governmental
organisations (IGOs), including the EU. Since its options for exit, and therefore
structural power, are diminished at the international and regional levels,
including within the EU, business has had to rely much more on agency in order
to influence policy outcomes at this level. The result of more successful lobbying
has been that the gap between business views and international and regional
governmental bodies has narrowed in recent years. International business1 has
helped to establish a consensus around social policy that has shifted policy
agendas, including those of the major IGOs, towards a more pro-business
one (Farnsworth, 2005). As a result, the EU’s competitiveness agenda is almost
identical to the key demands made by international business and, where policies
to control the negative aspects of corporate activities have been proposed at the
international level, strong lobbying from business has ensured that only voluntary
codes of conduct have so far been introduced (ibid.). International business and
IGOs have, in turn, pushed states towards productive corporate-centred social
provision in which the private sector plays a more prominent role. While global
social policy may have been made more necessary by globalisation (Deacon,
1997), it has been challenged by the rise of an increasingly well-organised and
powerful international business sector.
Turning now to the national level, as far as political agency is concerned
British business has had mixed fortunes in terms of access and success within
the policy arena. The CBI, the UK’s largest employers association, for instance,
was initially excluded from the national policy arena during the early 1980s,
replaced by the Institute of Directors as the business association of choice by
the Thatcher Government. As a result, the CBI was actually consulted less after
the election of the Conservatives in 1979 than it had been under the previous
Labour administration. The early effect of this was that the relative cost to the
CBI of exercising its voice at the national level was increased and this forced the
organisation to examine new ways of how it might more effectively concentrate
its resources on influencing government. One of its solutions was to place greater
emphasis on mechanisms of business influence that were relatively inexpensive.
It sought to improve its lobbying techniques through producing clear and concise
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policy statements and made more efforts to communicate the view of business
direct to the general public through the greater use of press releases and by
staging its high-profile annual conferences. It also placed greater emphasis on
the role of individual business members and its regional branches in placing
pressure on local government and local services. This coincided with central
government placing increasingly rigorous requirements on local councils and
service providers to ensure the integration of business representatives within
decision-making structures.
While the voice of business was initially muted on the national level, however,
central government increased the number of openings at the local level and
increased both its voice and role in local services during the same period (see
below). This changed again with the fall of Thatcher and the rise of Major as leader
of the Conservative Party. The voice of business at the national level recovered
as the new government sought to build bridges with industry. As a result, the
Institute of Directors (IOD) was effectively re-consigned to obscurity and the
CBI was reconfirmed as the most credible and representative voice of business.
As for labour, its power was drastically reduced by a series of measures designed
to reduce the ability of trade unions to take effective strike action, coupled by
increasing levels of unemployment, which dramatically reduced trade union
membership.
Under Labour, some limited trade union rights have been restored and
trade union membership has increased, but the voice of business has also greatly
increased in strength. Structural power has not diminished, and agency at the
national and local levels has become more salient. As a result business was
in a far stronger position at the beginning of the twenty-first century than it
had been in decades. It has been consulted more frequently and co-opted into
various decision-making bodies in a deliberate attempt to increase the voice of
business in Britain. Labour’s priorities were outlined clearly by Blair at the CBI’s
1997 conference, which was the first time the employers’ organisation had been
addressed by a sitting Labour prime minister:
when I last addressed the CBI’s National conference, I promised a new partnership between New
Labour and business. Six months into office, we have laid the foundations of that partnership.
There are business people bringing their experience and expertise by serving in Government,
on Advisory Groups, leading task forces, all contributing to the success of Government policy.
But there is also great commitment and enthusiasm, right across the Government, for forging
links with the business community. That this is the approach of a Labour government is of
historic importance. It demonstrates we are entering a new era in British politics. (Blair, Speech
to the CBI Conference, 11 November 1997)
So successful was the strategy to deliver this new politics that the outgoing
president of the CBI, Clive Thompson, explained to the Financial Times that the
working relationship between the CBI and the Labour government was, in 2000,
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‘probably closer than at any time in the last 25 years’ and certainly closer than
under the Thatcher or Major governments (Brown, 2000).
Neither has this improved access been limited to the main business
organisations. According to official documents leaked to the BBC and Corporate-
Watch in 2001, UK government officials briefed the leaders of some of the UK’s
and US’s largest companies on their negotiating position at the 2001 General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) meetings, despite the fact that these
negotiations were supposed to be conducted in private (Palast, 2001a, 2001b).
More recently, the parliamentary ombudsman ordered the government to make
public secret meetings between it and representatives of major corporations who
lobbied the government for lucrative state contracts (Evans and Leigh, 2004). This
followed allegations that one company, PowderJect, was awarded a £32 million
contract, without having to compete with other firms, to produce a smallpox
vaccine (ibid.). The chief executive of the company had previously donated
£100,000 to the Labour Party and had met with Tony Blair prior to the decision
to award the contract without competition, and prior to the contract finally
being awarded. Following the decision by the Ombudsman, the government
acknowledged that Tony Blair had met privately with other senior company
executives with an interest in winning public contracts on at least six occasions
between 2000–01 (ibid.).
With regard to social policy, the political engagement of business varies with
the area of provision in question. Business responses are also often less well
defined and less clearly expressed than in other policy areas and, as a result,
business often responds rather than leads social policy reforms (Farnsworth,
1998, 2004b). The key predictor of the level of lobbying and engagement is
the extent to which social policies have an immediate and direct impact on
productivity and profitability, including labour costs, and the quality, costs and
supply of the labour pool. The CBI, for instance, has tended to defend services
that directly benefit business (such as infrastructure spending) and help improve
labour productivity (such as education and training).2 At the same time, the CBI
has attacked spending on unproductive areas, such as wages and unconditional
social security payments. It has also pushed for greater business involvement in
those areas of social policy that increase productivity, especially those impacting
on the skills of labour. While it has opposed spending on public sector wages,
business has defended spending on purchases from the private sector, since they
help to support business sales, including capital investments.
In many respects, there has been little need for organised business and
firms to seek to influence social policy during recent years since, in most ways
and in most areas, social policy has been steered in a pro-business direction
by politicians. Structural influences, reinforced by globalisation, have promoted
cuts in spending on unproductive services and expansion in productive services.
Business has tended to become involved where it needed to make governments
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aware of the harm that some cuts were doing, or where it needed to develop
the policy details within productive services: for example, setting the direction of
education and training policy (Farnsworth, 2004a). Beyond this, it was enough to
limit its campaigns to the major questions that were of key interest to most parts
of business, such as tax reform and labour costs. Provided business could secure
for itself cuts in general and corporate taxation and commitments to reduce
spending in non-productive areas, it could limit its focus to these key issues.
With focused activity, therefore, business has successfully pushed for a more
corporate-centred welfare state: social provision funded through taxation on
labour rather than business; spending cuts, especially at the local level; cuts
in corporate taxation, especially local business rates; the increased targeting of
benefits; an increased emphasis on vocational skills within education; increased
participation in post-compulsory education and training; the establishment of
tighter educational targets; increased business involvement in key services; an
increased reliance on outsourcing; increased targeting of social provision and
reliance on private provision; and increased private sector inputs into services (see
Farnsworth, 1998, 2004a). This renewed agency capacity has been complemented
by increased structural power and a sympathetic international discourse so that
nationally British business has not had to battle as hard as it might otherwise
have had to in order to promote these kinds of reforms; social policy has been
steered in a pro-business direction by Labour without much prompting. For the
most part, it has been enough for business to limit its campaigns to issues of
central importance to business: regulations, tax reform, access to markets and
labour costs.
Institutional involvement
Labour’s approach to the management of welfare services is really a
continuation of a strategy which can be traced back to the 1960s. Governments
since then have, with increasing vigour, sought to examine ways in which the
welfare state might be transformed from one that was perceived to be damaging
to business to one that could complement and reinvigorate the private sector. For
Labour in the 1960s the answer lay in corporatist intermediation: the integration
of organised labour and organised business into decision making and agreement
structures covering a range of issues from pay to the establishment of local training
strategies. The 1970s Labour government also kick-started the contemporary
debate on the importance of closing the gap between state provision and the
requirements of local employers. James Callaghan explained in his Ruskin College
speech of 1976 that the failure of education to fit with the needs of business was
the main cause of Britain’s economic malaise. The answer lay, he argued, in
the development of closer and more formal links between schools and local
employers. The post-1979 Conservative government subsequently widened this
debate to other parts of the welfare state, although, for them, the emphasis centred
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as much on how state services could benefit from the inputs of business people
as how far social policies could meet the needs of business.
Under the Conservatives, business came to assume greater responsibilities
and leadership roles in areas previously monopolised by local authority repres-
entatives including in education, housing, care services and transport (Oatley,
1998). Senior business people were statutorily guaranteed a majority presence
on the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and school governing bodies,
and encouraged to get more closely involved in the running of health authorities
and trusts, the government replaced local authority representation with business
people and other ‘stakeholders’, and replaced local authority financing with
direct central government grants, backed up with increasingly large amounts
of private funding. With regard to the delivery of services, compulsory competi-
tive tendering (CCT), first introduced in 1980 for construction and extended to
other services from 1988, and the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), introduced in
1992, forced local authorities to contract out the management and delivery of
provision to the private sector. The establishment of public–private partnerships
and the increasing use of conditional funding from the 1990s, where monies
were only released to councils for certain projects if partnerships with the private
sectors were already in place (Coulson, 1997: 34; Coates et al., 2000), sped up this
process, increasing still further the opportunities for business involvement. By the
time Labour came to power in 1997, therefore, business needs were already shaping
welfare outcomes and business people had been well embedded into key services.
The Labour government enthusiastically built upon Conservative policies by
seeking to embed business people, firms and values still further into social policy.
While quasi-markets represented stepping stones to wholesale privatisation for
the Conservatives, for New Labour private sector involvement in state social
provision represented an ideal way to deliver services, where public finance
would allow the private sector to deliver services more efficiently and more
innovatively than the public sector alone could manage. Whereas previous Labour
governments had tried to shield public services from what were felt to be the
corrosive qualities of markets, New Labour has tended to view the private sector
as the saviour of the welfare state from inefficient public sector managers and
employees. As Falconer and McLaughlin (2000: 122) put it:
A clear distinguishing feature of ‘New Labour’, as opposed to ‘Old Labour’, is the nature of
its posture toward the private sector. A political party which once held firmly to the view that
the State should play a leading role in the workings of the nation’s economy now promotes the
belief that very little can be achieved in government without the active support of business.
This approach to social policy built upon a more established view within the
Labour Party and the social democratic left more generally, that social policy can
and should underpin efficient and competitive markets. Under New Labour, the
pursuit of such goals has been translated into policies that prioritise, fetishise and
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seek to embed private sector values, management and delivery systems into state
welfare.
To increase the role of business within social policy beyond that already
achieved by the Conservative government required radical institutional changes
in both the public and private spheres. For the Labour Party, it began in opposition
with changes to its own constitution. In 1995, Blair and his supporters fought an
acrimonious battle within the Labour Party to change Clause IV of its constitution
from one that proposed the nationalisation of industry to one that committed
the Party to the pursuit of ‘a dynamic economy, serving the public interest, in
which the enterprise of the market and the rigour of competition are joined with
the forces of partnership and co-operation’. The trade unions were told that there
was no alternative but to increase private sector involvement in state services if
the welfare state was to improve and survive and, at the same time, business was
courted in order to prime it for the increased role Labour had in mind for it.
Under a range of initiatives, including Education Action Zones (1998), the
expansion of specialist schools (first introduced by the Conservatives in 1994),
and the establishment of city academies (2000), the government has encouraged
increasingly formal engagement by business people and companies in the delivery
of state services. Increasing attempts have been made to bypass local authorities
altogether, beginning with the EAZs, where firms were encouraged to take the
lead (Dickson et al., 2002: 185), and culminating in 1999 with wholesale takeovers
of failing schools by private companies (see below).
Given that the government has sought to increase the voice of business where
it was previously relatively weak, it is no surprise to find that Labour has done
little to weaken business where private interests had already dominated policy
for some time. In opposition, Labour had been highly critical of the dominance
of business and other elite interests on the management boards of TECs, but
Labour’s replacement of them by the Learning and Skills Councils (LSCs) was
designed to ‘give employers unprecedented influence over the education system
and promote a better match between demand and supply for skills’ (DfES, 1999:
10). Although trade unions and locally elected constituencies did find better
representation within the new bodies, employers retained a dominant voice.
In 2003, of the 15 members of the LSCs National Council, five were business
representatives, including the Director General of the CBI, the Chief Executive
of ATL Telecom, the former Managing Director of Coca Cola Great Britain, and
former partner of Anderson Consulting. The Chair of the LSC was also the Chair
of BUPA and the former Managing Director of BP. The rest of the members were
made up of various educationalists and government workers along with John
Monks, who in 2003 was the outgoing General Secretary of the TUC. The vast
majority of the local LSC Chairs and Executives were also occupied by senior
business people (Learning and Skills Council, Who’s Who, 2002/3). Moreover,
since the responsibilities of the LSCs were extended to cover education–business
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partnerships and further education in addition to post-16 vocational training, the
scope for business influence on provision has been widened still further under
these new bodies.
In health care, too, the government looked to business to help provide
answers to perceived failings in the sector. Although attempts had already
been made by the Conservatives to increase business involvement on various
health boards during the 1980s (Ashburner and Cairncross, 1993; Cairncross and
Ashburner, 1992; Farnsworth, 2004a, 2006), New Labour has found new ways of
integrating business into health care. Health Action Zones (HAZs), for instance,
were established in 1997 as an attempt to develop innovative and integrated
solutions to local health care needs in partnership with the voluntary and private
sectors (Whitfield, 2001: 106–7). Later, the government moved from this relatively
benign initial involvement of business in health service management to more
concerted efforts to integrate the private sector into the NHS. Towards this end,
Foundation Hospitals were established in 2004, which would operate as semi-
independent public companies in competition with other Trusts. The Labour
government also deliberately set out to recruit senior private sector managers for
key positions within NHS boards (Carvel, 2003).
The government has also looked to the private sector for assistance in the
running of its New Deal programme. Most obviously, the success of the New Deal
depended on employers participating in the scheme by offering work placements
and training, albeit with inducements. In addition, the government outsourced
the running of some New Deal services to private companies (Griffiths, 1998: 4),
and senior business people have been drafted in as advisers and managers. The
Chief Executive of Prudential, for example, was appointed as chair to the New
Deal Task Force, while the Chief Executive of Barclays Bank was given the task of
overseeing a review of benefits and the tackling of social exclusion.
Provision and production
The extent of corporate involvement in the different types of provision
outlined earlier varies greatly. The production of certain welfare-related goods has
always been undertaken predominantly in the private sector. This is particularly
true of pharmaceuticals and medical equipment, where huge global corporations
dominate production (Holden, 2005). The pharmaceutical sector in particular
has been undergoing a profound process of global concentration driven by the
perceived economies of scale necessary for research and development if innovative
new drugs are to be continued to be discovered. As indicated above, governments
have found it necessary to balance the need to regulate such firms with the need
to develop them as key industries in a competitive global market.
Suppliers of services to state providers have also often been located in the
private sector, with a number of large, often internationalised, pharmaceutical
and medical wholesalers acting as intermediaries between producers and state
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providers of services. Ancillary services such as cleaning and catering have often
also been moved into the private sector where once they were provided ‘in-house’,
as governments have sought to cut costs and realise perceived efficiencies.
As far as health is concerned, private insurance services have not increased
significantly under New Labour and public spending in this area has increased
significantly. Pensions, on the other hand, have been increasingly shifted into
the private and quasi-private sector with the expansion of stakeholder pensions.
However, as we have seen above, to the extent that direct provision of welfare
services is shifted into the private sector, the scope exists for the development of an
extensive market in physical assets investment. Furthermore, the UK government
is in the process of expanding this type of activity enormously through school
and hospital projects involving PFI.
With regard to occupational welfare, successive governments have been
increasingly eager to encourage expanded work-based social provision as
contemporary political and economic pressures have reduced the room for
governments to borrow and raise additional revenue from higher personal and
corporate taxes in order to fund state provision. In addition, employers have
been asked to play a more active role in the co-ordination and, in certain
cases, the funding and delivery of state benefits, including sickness benefits,
maternity benefits, tax credits and the various forms of provision associated
with the New Deal. Employers have also been asked to increase their own
provision in order to improve the ‘family friendliness’ of employment and to
assist with the costs and administration of benefits that were previously the
sole domain of the state. Despite these rising expectations, however, firms have
been reluctant to increase the size of occupational welfare and have resisted
government attempts to place more responsibility on employers for the co-
ordination of state provision. What this has meant in practice is that, while the
cost of statutory provision has increased, employers have reduced the relative size
of their voluntary contributions over the past 20 years (Farnsworth, 2004b).
However, perhaps the most important area of corporate involvement is in
the direct provision of welfare services. The extent of this varies greatly between
particular sectors, although private provision here is generally less developed
than in many of the other types of provision. In the UK, for example, it is
now the norm for long-term care to be provided in the private sector, while
hospital provision is predominantly undertaken directly by the state. However,
recent changes have seen private companies being brought in to take over the
management and delivery of some NHS services. In the first such move, Secta,
a private consultancy firm, was awarded a £1.3 million contract to take over the
‘failing’ Good Hope hospital trust in Birmingham in September 2003. Secta is
also involved in a number of PFI projects in the NHS. The private sector has
also been invited to bid for contracts to run fast-track surgeries which are being
set up by the government to help tackle waiting lists (Dean, 2003). In one of
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the first such developments, the construction firm Jarvis was awarded a joint
contract with Interhealth Care Services, a Canadian health company, to build
and run orthopaedic units for patients waiting for hip or knee replacements
in January 2004 (Carvel, 2004a). The government also commissioned Netcare,
a South African private health company, to carry out cataract operations from
2003, placing pressure on primary care trusts (PCTs) to sign up for the deal even
against local wishes (Carvel, 2004b). The chairs of both the PCT and strategic
health authority in south Oxfordshire, for example, resigned following pressure
to sign up with Netcare. The chair of the strategic health authority explained in
an interview with the BBC that:
We were under tremendous pressure to get a yes vote . . . at all costs . . . because the centre
[Whitehall] wanted it to happen. (File on Four, 2004)
Similarly, a number of councils have been forced to contract out all or part of their
educational services to private firms, including in Bradford, Islington, Southwark
and Hackney. Other authorities, including Birmingham and Leeds, have called
in government-approved private consultants to help address the problems of
failing schools (UNISON, 2001). The Local Government Association, however,
was prevented from establishing an alternative public sector strategy for tackling
LEA failure (Slater, 2003). The 2002 Education Act (under part 5, section 70),
meanwhile, required that where an LEA seeks to set up a new secondary school
it must invite proposals from interested parties, including private firms. In yet
another indication of the faith that Labour has in business to devise solutions
to perceived failings in the public sector, it awarded a £1.9 million contract to
Jarvis to raise standards in 700 failing schools in England and Wales through
the setting up of a network to help local authorities disseminate good practice
(Slater, 2003).
Private companies have also been awarded contracts to run Employment
Zone services, where claimants and advisers decide how funds pooled into
Personal Job Accounts (PJA) might be used to develop ‘tailor-made’ assistance. In
2000, the employment agency Reed was contracted to run services in Haringey,
Newham and Liverpool, and Pertemps the service in Birmingham. A consortium
between Manpower, Cap Gemini/Ernst and Young and the Employment Service
was also awarded contracts to run seven Employment Zones.
While such developments still represent a minority of those welfare services
which have traditionally been run directly by the state in the UK, there are a
number of reasons why we might expect direct corporate provision of welfare
services to grow significantly in coming years. The first of these reasons relates
directly to the activities of the state. Governments are increasingly prepared to
transfer the provision of welfare services into the private sector, where previously
they have been undertaken by the state. The reasons for this are complex but relate
to ideological factors and to both the structural and agency power of businesses
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themselves, as already discussed. Ideologically, the perceived failure of communist
and social democratic alternatives to the market has strengthened the notion that
the market necessarily does things better than the state. Structurally, processes
of globalisation have led to an emphasis on competitiveness, and a concomitant
desire on the part of governments to act in the perceived interests of business. In
this climate, businesses have found it easier to use forms of political engagement
and institutional involvement to promote their specific interests. The policies of
governments in a range of social policy areas have thus permitted an expansion of
direct service provision. Where systems of public provision already exist, this has
often been accomplished through the implementation of a purchaser–provider
split, whereby services continue to be funded by taxation but may be delivered by
private sector providers. Thus, even where private insurance has not expanded,
public money has been used as a means of increasing corporate provision.
Processes at the international level may also have a significant impact on the
extent of direct private provision, as well as the degree of internationalisation of
that provision. The provisions of the General Agreement on Trade in Services
(GATS) may come to have a profound impact on the ways services are delivered
in developed, as well as developing, countries. GATS is the key negotiating
mechanism of members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for trade in
services, and forms a central part of the current Doha round of negotiations. The
provisions of the GATS are complex, but their primary goal is a steady increase
in international trade in services, including health and education. In order for a
service to be subject to the full provisions of the GATS, governments must choose
to include them through making a series of ‘commitments’, and commitments on
health and education services are currently fairly minimal (Adlung and Carzaniga,
2003). However, the aim of WTO negotiating rounds is ‘progressive liberalisation’
and, once undertaken, GATS commitments are extremely difficult to reverse.
Furthermore, business organisations have played a key role in lobbying for further
liberalisation, and are likely to continue to do so.
Conclusion
This article has mapped out the various forms of business input into social policy
under three key headings: political engagement, institutional participation, and
provision and production. These forms of business input relate to corporate
agency, but such agency is set within the context of structural factors affecting
corporate power. We have argued that the structural power of corporations
has increased in recent years, primarily as a result of the greater mobility of
corporate investment associated with processes of ‘globalisation’. However, what
is important is how governments respond to these new conditions. In the UK,
governments have responded by attempting to shape social policy so as to meet
the perceived needs of business, and by embedding business within the welfare
state, both through its increased participation in the management structures of
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welfare services and by increasing the opportunities for private sector provision
of services previously provided directly by the state. In doing so, governments
have sometimes led businesses in creating openings for their increased input into
social policy, and sometimes responded to pressure from the political activities
of businesses and their associations. Political processes at the international level
have facilitated this, as a result of both the dominance of neo-liberal ideas and as
a result of international corporate lobbying. International processes such as the
GATS negotiations are likely also to facilitate the internationalisation of business
inputs into social policy, as international markets in welfare services begin to
emerge.
The result of these processes is that business has never been so embedded in
social policy. These developments do not, of course, represent a return to a period
when the state intervened minimally in social questions but the adaptation of the
welfare state to both the articulated and perceived interests of business. As such,
they may well come to undermine social policy, as business interests become
entrenched at the heart of the welfare state, thus potentially limiting the scope
of policy in the future. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that business
power can vary over time, and that business interests will differ between firms
and sectors. In fact, businesses and their associations may not always be clear
about what is in their own interests, and governments have played a key role in
interpreting what is in the interests of businesses and implementing this. The
key role of governments in providing openings for businesses and in responding
to business demands should alert us to the fact that alternative approaches are
possible, and that current policies can be contested.
Notes
1 Led in particular by the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC) to the OECD,
the International Chambers of Commerce (ICC); the European Round Table (ERT); the
Union of Industrialists and Confederation of Employers (UNICE).
2 For a detailed discussion of the approach of organised business to social policy (see
Farnsworth, 1998, 2004a).
References
Adlung, R. and Carzaniga, A. (2003), ‘Trade in health services under GATS’, Geneva,
7 November.
Ashburner, L. and Cairncross, L. (1993), ‘Membership of the “new style” health authorities:
continuity or change?’, Public Administration, 71: 357–75.
Block, F. (1977), ‘The ruling class does not rule: notes on the Marxist theory of the state’, Social
Revolution, 7: 6–28.
Bonnett, K. (1985), ‘Corporatism and Thatcherism. Is there life after death?’, in A. Cawson
(ed.), Organized Interests and the State: Studies in Meso Corporatism, London: Sage.
Brown, K. (2000), ‘CBI chief’s valediction is upbeat about Euro: industry could cope with the
single currency at an exchange rate of DM2.85, Sir Clive Thompson tells Kevin Brown’,
Financial Times, 10 July.
Cairncross, L. and Ashburner, L. (1992), NHSTrust Boards: The FirstWave the First Year, Bristol:
NHS Training Directorate.
the business-social policy nexus 493
Carvel, J. (2003), ‘Headhunt for NHS boardrooms’, The Guardian, 3 March.
Carvel, J. (2004a), ‘Jarvis involved in health centres’, The Guardian, 17 January.
Carvel, J. (2004b), ‘NHS trusts bullied into private contracts’, The Guardian, 1 June.
Coates, A., Farnsworth, K. and Zulauf, M. (2000), ‘Social exclusion and inclusion: partnerships
for neighbourhood regeneration in London’, South Bank University Occasional Paper,
London.
Coulson, A. (1997), ‘Business partnerships and regional government’, Policy and Politics, 25: 1,
31–9.
Deacon, B. (1997), Global Social Policy, London: Sage.
Dean, M. (2003), ‘New prescription for hospitals’, The Guardian, 8 January.
Department for Education and Science (DfES) (1999), Learning to Succeed: A New Framework
for Post-16 Learning, London: HMSO.
Dickson, M., Germitz, S., Halpin, D., Power, S. and Whitty, G. (2002), ‘Education action zones’,
in C. Glendinning, M. Powell and K. Rummery (eds), Partnerships, New Labour and the
Governance of Welfare, Bristol: Policy Press.
Evans, R. and Leigh, D. (2004), ‘Downing St forced to reveal secret meetings’, The Guardian,
16 March.
Falconer, P. K. and McLaughlin, K. (2000), ‘Public–private partnerships and the “New Labour”
government in Britain’, in S. P. Osborne (ed.), Public–Private Partnerships: Theory and
Practice in International Perspective, London: Routledge.
Farnsworth, K. (1998), ‘Minding the business interest: the CBI and social policy, 1980–1996’,
Policy Studies, 19: 19–38.
Farnsworth, K. (2004a), Corporate Power and Social Policy in a Global Economy: British Influence
Under the Influence, Bristol: Policy Press.
Farnsworth, K. (2004b), ‘The caring corporation? An audit of occupational social provision at
the turn of the new century’, Social Policy and Administration, 38: 5, 437–55.
Farnsworth, K. (2006), ‘Capital to the rescue? New Labour’s corporate solutions to old welfare
problems’, Critical Social Policy, forthcoming.
Farnsworth, K. (2005), ‘Business perspectives on welfare: organised business and European
social policy’, Journal of European Social Policy, 15: 1, 65–80.
Griffiths, J. (1998), ‘Good neighbours? A critique of business involvement in local economic
development’, Local Economy, 2–9 May.
Held, D., McGrew, A., Goldblatt, D. and Perraton, J. (1999), Global Transformations: Politics,
Economics and Culture, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Holden, C. (2003), ‘Actors and motives in the internationalization of health businesses’,Business
and Politics, 5: 3, 287–302.
Holden, C. (2005), ‘The internationalisation of corporate healthcare: extent and emerging
trends’, Competition and change, 9: 2, 185–203.
Lindblom, C. E. (1977), Politics and Markets, New York: Basic Books.
Miliband, R. (1969), The State in Capitalist Society, London: Quartet Books.
Mishra, R. (1999), Globalization and the Welfare State, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Oatley, N. (ed.) (1998), Cities, Economic Competition andUrban Policy, London: Paul Chapman.
Offe, C. and Ronge, V. (1982), ‘Theses on the theory of the state’, in A. Giddens and D. Held
(eds), Classes, Power and Conflict, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Offe, C. and Weisenthal, H. (1980), ‘Two logics of collective action: theoretical notes on social
class and organisational form’, in M. Zeitlin (ed.), Political Power and Social Theory,
Greenwich, CN: JAI Press.
Palast, G. (2001a), ‘The WTO’s hidden agenda’, The Observer, 9 November.
Palast, G. (2001b), ‘Gats got his tongue’, The Observer, 15 April.
Pierson, P. (1995), ‘The scope and nature of business power: employers and the American
welfare state, 1900–1935’, unpublished manuscript, Harvard University.
Przeworski, A. and Wallerstein, M. (1988), ‘Structural dependence of the state on capital’,
American Political Science Review, 82: 11–29.
Roth, W. (2002), The Assault on Social Policy, New York: Columbia University Press.
494 kevin farnsworth and chris holden
Scott, J. (1991), Who Rules Britain, Oxford: Polity Press.
Slater, J. (2003), ‘Private sector fails to deliver’, Times Educational Supplement, 4 April.
Slater, J. and Henry, J. (2002), ‘Do we need a commercial break? Campaigners call for
tighter controls as schools become increasingly reliant on cash from big business’, Times
Educational Supplement, 13 September.
Strange, S. (1996), The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Swank, D. (2002), Global Capital, Political Institutions and Policy Change in Developed Welfare
States, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
UNISON (2001), ‘Private Sector Involvement Increases’, UNISON Report ED/29/01, UNISON,
London.
Whitfield, D. (2001), Public Services or Corporate Welfare: Rethinking the Nation State in the
Global Economy, London: Pluto Press.
Winters, J. A. (1996), Power in Motion: Capital Mobility and the Indonesian State, New York:
Cornell University Press.
